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HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE I850S TO
THE i98oS. By Robert Stevens.' Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The
University of North Carolina Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 334.
Reviewed by Gene R. Shreve2
Robert Stevens' book, Law School: Legal Education in America
from the 185os to the i98os, is the closest thing to a history of modern
American legal education yet to appear.3 Because of its thoroughness
and scope, 4 the book will doubtless dominate a literary field that has
heretofore been a mosaic of generally self-congratulatory histories of
individual law schools5 and analyses of particular developments in
legal education, 6 supplemented by Stevens' own preliminary work.7
But although Law School is well written and carefully documented,
it is not a complete history of American legal education. Because the
I President, Haverford College; Professor of Law, Yale University.
2 Associate Professor, New York Law School. University of Oklahoma, A.B., I965; Harvard
University, LL.B., 1968; LL.M., 1975. I wish to thank Marguerite R. Shreve, who read and
made thoughtful comments on the manuscript.
3 Stevens notes the work, now dated, of Alfred Z. Reed, see A. REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1928); A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921) [hereinafter cited as A. REED, TRAINING], and Josef Redlich,
see J. REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOLS (1914). Stevens persuasively argues that the modern-day significance of these authors
derives more from their role as historical figures than from their status as historians (pp. i12-
30).
4 The author undertakes a description of law schools' "function in the social evolution of
law, lawyers, and higher education" (p. xiii).
5 For a survey and critique of this branch of the literature, see Konefsky & Schlegel, Mirror,
Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982). The
authors bemoan the fact that most of these institutional histories follow the same formula:
Simply put, the school grows from humble, but auspicious, beginnings to early
triumphs and then through occasional hard times, though with never more than a
momentary temptation to backslide from fixed and noble goals, to a place - if only a
small place - in the sun.
Id. at 836.
In his book, Stevens has made use of even the least scholarly examples of the genre by
drawing liberally from law school histories as sources of illustrative material.
6 E.g., Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pts. 1-3), 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331 (i95I), 8 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (I955); First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (pts. I & 2), 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 311 (1978), 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1049 (1979).
7 The author notes two articles that laid the groundwork for the book: Stevens, Two Cheers
for z870: The American Law School, 5 PERsp. AM. HIST. 405 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Stevens,
Two Cheers], and Stevens, Law Schools and Legal Education, 1879-1979: Lectures in Honor of
zoo Years of Valparaiso Law School, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 179 (T980). Of his other writings,
Stevens, Democracy and the Legal Profession, LEARNING & L., Fall 1976, at 12 [hereinafter
cited as Stevens, Democracy], is particularly revealing of attitudes about legal education that
Stevens, in his role as historian, seems reluctant to express: in Democracy, Stevens characterizes
the legal profession as a monopoly in need of drastic reform.
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book's discussion of events of the past thirty years tends to be unfo-
cused, Law School is most effective as a history of legal education
between 185o and 1950.8
Law School provides historical data on such aspects of legal edu-
cation as curriculum, legal scholarship, admissions, and law school
economics. But the book is not simply an arid presentation of facts.
It tells the story of the growth of institutional (usually university) law
schools and the decline and near extinction of two competing ap-
proaches to legal education - proprietary law schools and law office
apprenticeships. This narrative is central to the book, and it is when
Stevens relates it that his history works best.
Although privately controlled proprietary law schools initially dom-
inated American legal education, "the pendulum began to swing back"
in the 1850's as institutional law schools emerged and the bar became
more organized (p. io). By 1950, institutional law schools nearly
monopolized the means of entry into the legal profession. In Law
School, Stevens captures this dramatic shift in American legal edu-
cation. He demonstrates that the struggle of institutional law schools
for supremacy was long and difficult. Despite the institutional law
schools' assault on the alternative legal training offered by law office
apprenticeships, as late as 1922 not one state required attendance at
law school for admission to the bar (p. 172). Similarly, the universities'
war against proprietary schools met with only mixed success until the
Depression years (p. 177). The ultimate ascendancy of institutional
law schools, Stevens' history suggests, was less a triumph of the ideals
of professional competence than a result of tenacity, opportunism, and
advantageous alliances.
I.
Because few events that occurred before i85o are important to
Stevens' portrayal of competing modes of legal education, this early
period receives only introductory treatment (pp. 3-10). 9 Stevens
writes of the failure of attempts to accommodate law teaching within
the American university structure soon after the Revolutionary War:
the egalitarian sentiments of Jacksonian democracy eventually re-
versed the nascent trend toward institutionalized legal education. The
most significant law schools of tle early i8oo's were not closely affil-
iated branches of established universities, but rather proprietary law
schools, such as Litchfield Law School in Connecticut, which were
outgrowths of the law offices of practitioners who had shown them-
s The book's sketchy treatment of the years before 185o detracts little from the book's
completeness, because developments in American legal education before x85o were relatively
insignificant.
9 A more extensive treatment of this period may be found in Mcdlanis, The History of First
Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 597 (z981).
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selves to be particularly accomplished teachers (pp. 3-4). 1O With the
decrease in or disappearance of requirements for admission to practice
- requirements that had essentially mimicked the profession's require-
ments in Europe - the profession during the Jacksonian period at-
tached relatively little importance to formal legal training of any
kind."
The I85o's brought renewed interest by universities in legal edu-
cation. The book does not make the reason for this interest clear but
suggests that it might have stemmed from dissatisfaction among law-
yers with the effects of the Jacksonian era's lowered requirements for
admission to the bar. 12 The aspirations of university law schools in
the 185o's were demonstrably elitist. Such elitism, Stevens suggests,
would thereafter remain a constant in the institutional law school
outlook, though the expression of elitist notions would become more
sophisticated. 13
Under the leadership of Theodore W. Dwight, the Columbia Law
School became the first of the university law schools to reach a position
of prominence in legal education, and it remained the leading school
until it was "ultimately overshadowed by the rise of the Harvard Law
School in the decades after 1870" (p. 36). Stevens attributes Harvard's
rise to President Charles Eliot and Dean Christopher Columbus Lang-
dell, both appointed in 1870. 14 Although Stevens may overstate Har-
10 But see McManis, supra note 9, at 609-20 (finding a more significant role for university
professorships in American legal education during this period and attributing less importance to
proprietary schools).
11 The author reviews this trend (pp. 3-8) but suggests that it did not produce the erosion
of professional standards of bench and bar that previous commentators have perceived. He
also notes that the levelling effect of Jacksonian democracy on the profession varied by region.
12 Many members of the bar had become concerned about the number of attorneys admitted
to practice after little or no training (p. 24). Stevens suggests that at about the same time there
was developing a "middle-class urge to get ahead through structured education," and that law
was beginning to provide the opportunities of a "boom industry" (p. 22).
13 The unvarnished appeals to elitism made by law schools in the 185O's may jar the modern
reader. Quoting from admissions recruitment literature, Stevens discloses that the University of
Georgia Law School sought "'young men who intend to devote themselves to the honorable
employment of cultivating the estates they inherit from their fathers,'" (p. 21) (quoting LAW
DEP'T, UNIV. OF GA., ANNOUNCEMENT (Athens, Ga. 1859) and that New York University
Law School sought a "'class of young men, who are hereafter to control the mercantile and
commercial interests of our country"' (p. 21) (quoting LAW DEP'T, N.Y. UNIV., ANNUAL
ANNOUNCEMENT OF LECTURES, 1858-59, at 9-1o (New York 1858)).
14 Langdell was the first dean of Harvard Law School, and probably the first dean of any
law school. THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: 1817-1917, at 27
(i918). He is easily the most controversial figure in the history of American legal education.
Portraits vary from the reverential view in the Centennial History to Holmes' wry description
of Langdell as the "greatest living legal theologian" (p. 142 n.I) (quoting Holmes, Book Review,
14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (i88o)) to Grant Gilmore's depiction of Langdell as a "crude and
simplistic" thinker (p. 71 n.88) (quoting G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977)).
Stevens' own view is somewhat equivocal. On the one hand, he gives Langdell considerable
credit for refining (if not originating) the revolutionary case method (p. 36). But he also suggests
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vard's contribution to the development of legal education, he correctly
observes that it was in part through Harvard's influence and example
that institutional law schools achieved two important, permanent
gains in their struggle for supremacy. University law school training
"was established as de rigeur for leaders of the profession," and "law
was accepted, finally and irrevocably, as an appropriate study for
university education" (p. 36) (footnote omitted).
Langdell's insistence upon teaching law as a science' s was to some
extent a reaction to the slipshod pedagogy of his time. For those
seeking entry to the profession through law office apprenticeship,
training in legal theory - and even clinical experience - was usually
minimal or nonexistent (p. 24). Those choosing the pre-Langdellian
law school alternative encountered a lecture system that emphasized
passive learning and rote note-taking rather than analytical skills (pp.
54, 67 n.24). Langdell's response was the so-called case method,
which was built upon "the assumption that principles were best dis-
covered in appellate court opinions" (p. 52), and which required the
student to "find his way by himself" to the legal concepts underlying
each case (p. 54). Despite opposition, the case method spread so
rapidly that by the turn of the century it "was recognized as the
innovation in legal education" (p. 63). Along with the new method
came a new kind of law professor - a change epitomized by the 1873
appointment of James Barr Ames, "the first of a new breed of aca-
demic lawyer . . . who was appointed for his scholarly and teaching
potential" (p. 38).
If.
The rise of institutional schools paralleled the efforts of academics
and practitioners to form elitist organizations. 16 In 1878, the practic-
ing bar founded the American Bar Association (ABA), which by i9oo
included most of the leading figures of the profession but only a small
percentage of all practicing lawyers (p. 97). By recommending more
formal training as a prerequisite to practice, the ABA attempted to
disassociate itself from the incompetent and unethical practices it
that Langdell might have been a far less significant figure without the support of Eliot, "whose
innovations on both the undergraduate and graduate level of the university had a powerful
influence over Langdell. It was largely through Eliot's efforts and his 'social relations' that the
Harvard Law School method was accepted by other schools and scholars . . ." (p. 36) (footnote
omitted).
Is Langdell contended that
[1]aw, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty
to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . .(P.
52) (quoting C. LAJNGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAWv OF CONTRACTS viii
(2d ed. 1879)).
16 In I881, the ABA House of Delegates passed its first resolution on the standardization of
legal education and thereby initiated "what was to be a century-long crusade" (p. 93).
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regarded as rampant in the profession. 17 Academic lawyers echoed
these concerns by remaining aloof from "undesirables" and by urging
the ABA to call for the creation of a "reputable" law school organi-
zation. The establishment of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) followed in i9OO (p. 96).18
Despite early differences, the academics of the AALS and the
governing elite of the ABA had much in common, and from the 1920'S
onward they worked closely together to influence the direction of
American legal education. 19 They shared an "ideal of the perfect
lawyer" - a college graduate trained in the case method tradition of
the university law school. Stevens writes that their goal was
to get rid of schools that did not follow orthodox methods or that
admitted students who had not followed a conventional educational
pattern. The professionals hoped to accomplish this by urging state
legislatures to raise prelaw and law school structural requirements so
high that these law schools would be deprived of their natural mar-
kets, the lower socioeconomic groups. (P. 102).
This attitude was similar to that of the medical elite toward what
it regarded as marginal medical schools. But whereas the American
Medical Association was able to eliminate such schools by I917, the
ABA and AALS would not achieve their aim until the late I94O's.2 °
17 The second half of the i9th century saw great expansion of the law school industry. Many
universities developed law schools or acquired proprietary law schools already in existence.
Proprietary schools themselves rapidly proliferated during the same period, although they tended
to specialize in part-time and evening education (pp. 74-79). States promoted the law school
boom by tightening requirements for admission to the bar to include apprenticeship or, in the
alternative, law school training. Law schools were largely free, however, to set admissions
standards and to design programs of instruction as they saw fit (p. 76).
Is The AALS began with 25 member schools. Each school was required to meet standards
similar to those the ABA - without success - had recommended that legislatures impose upon
the training of all prospective lawyers. Thus, entering students had to be high school graduates,
and programs of instruction had to be at least two years long. After the standards were first
approved by the AALS in 1896, they were periodically raised (pp. 96-97).
19 In 2923, the ABA began listing "approved" law schools. Standards for ABA approval
generally developed in tandem with standards for AALS membership, and "by 1927 the ABA
list of approved schools was almost identical with the membership of the AALS" (p. i74). A
law school's accreditation, though not yet a condition of the eligibility of the school's graduates
to practice, nonetheless meant the difference between elite and nonelite status. In the late
192o's, about one-half of the country's law schools were in the elite category, yet these schools
enrolled only one-third of the country's law students (p. 174).
20 Stevens' book provides a fascinating comparison of the contemporaneous offensives of the
American Medical Association (AMA) and the ABA. Using the Carnegie Foundation's study of
medical education and the resulting Flexner Report as a catalyst, the AMA enlisted the coop-
eration of states in raising standards and forced many medical schools either to upgrade admis-
sions requirements and facilities dramatically or to close (pp. i02-o3). The ABA's attempt to
achieve similar aims was frustrated for several reasons. Two reports on legal education issued
under the auspices of the Carnegie Foundation in 1914 and 2922, see J. REDLICH, supra note
3; A. REED, TRAINING, supra note 3, undermined rather than reinforced the ABA's position.
The authors of the reports, Alfred Z. Reed and Joseph Redlich, refused to support a single
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Their eventual success, moreover, resulted in part from the pres-
sures of larger events: the Depression and World War II. As financial
fears during the Depression gave new force to arguments that the
legal profession was overcrowded, states finally began imposing stiffer
prerequisites to practice - requirements that cut into the market of
schools not accredited by the AALS and the ABA (pp. 177-78).21 The
further depletion of the student market caused by World War II and
the draft also hit unaccredited law schools especially hard (pp. 198-
99).22 The final blow was the enactment of federal and state programs
to aid returning veterans. The government gave veterans the means
to afford full-time day programs instead of the night or part-time legal
education offered by unaccredited schools. In effect, this aid was a
subsidy for the more prestigious law schools (pp. 205-06), which
quickly expanded to absorb the new influx of students. 23 Meanwhile,
state legislatures continued to toughen standards for admission to the
bar. The cumulative result of these forces was a dramatic decline in
enrollment at unaccredited law schools by the late 1950's (p. 207).
Stevens does not conclusively determine the extent to which the
ascendancy of elite schools should be credited to the ABA-AALS
alliance rather than to the force of outside events. 24 But his narrative
makes clear that the elite schools' success would not have been possible
without the untiring efforts of that alliance. Worth noting, therefore,
are the mixed motives of the ABA and the AALS. On the one hand,
both groups seemed consistently interested in elevating the competence
and ethics of the legal profession. On the other hand, "the leaders of
the bar shared the then-current assumptions about the ethnic superi-
ority of native white Americans" (p. ioo)25 and hoped to exclude
standard for law practice or legal education; instead, they preferred the status quo's diversity
of educational settings and paths to practice (pp. 112-23). Moreover, even if the reports had
been favorable to the ABA's agenda, it is doubtful that the membership of either the ABA or
its ally, the AALS, would have been cohesive enough to exploit them until somewhat later (p.
io3). Finally, the ABA lacked the influence and grass roots organization of the AMA's lobbyists.
"The typical solo practitioner . . . was more likely to have rapport with state legislators than
were members of the legal establishment" (p. 176).
21 Between 1928 and 1932, the number of states requiring two years of prelegal college
education for admission to the bar nearly tripled, from six to seventeen (p. 177). Between 1928
and 1935, the number of students in ABA schools increased by 5000, while the enrollment in
unapproved schools fell by io,ooo (p. 177).
22 "What the ABA and the depression had begun, Hitler helped to complete" (p. 199).
23 State university law schools in particular were able to expand significantly as legislatures
sought to provide places for returning veterans (p. 206).
24 Stevens takes somewhat inconsistent views of the matter. At one point, he notes that
"[j]ust how much the decline in the number of unaccredited schools during the 1930s was due
to the depression, and how much to the establishment's continued raising of standards, still
remains unclear" (p. 177-78). Elsewhere, he suggests that "the structure of American legal
education" was "forged by the economic and social conditions of the Great Depression" (p. 279).
25 The author quotes numerous statements by leaders of the profession that reveal antagonism
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Jews, blacks, and immigrants by raising admission standards; aca-
demic lawyers who assailed unaccredited law schools were also ac-
tuated by this bias (p. 1O9 n.67), as well as by a simple desire to
reduce competition (p. IoO). Stevens concludes that "the attack on
night and part-time schools that opened the twentieth century seems
to have been a confusing mixture of public interest, economic oppor-
tunism, and ethnic prejudice" (p. IOI).26
The developments of the 193o's and 1940's culminated in the
virtual elimination of alternative paths to legal practice. By 1958,
most unaccredited law schools "had either been driven out of business
or had 'raised their standards"' (p. 207).27 During the ig6o's, entry
into the profession grew even more difficult as four years of college
became a standard prerequisite for law school admission (p. 209).
Because the law office apprenticeship option had also been largely
abolished by the I97o's, accredited law schools "had effectively be-
come the only portal of entry to the profession" (p. 238).
Ill.
In exploring each successive period in the development of the law
school, Stevens also surveys such topics as law school curriculum and
legal scholarship. At times, he manages to weave these themes into
the central narrative - the ascendance of university law schools. For
example, he ties the rise of the case method in universities to the
contemporaneous popularity of intellectual Darwinism (pp. 54-55) and
to the movement from substance to method in jurisprudence and law
school pedagogy (pp. 55-56). In this discussion, which contains some
of the most interesting material in the book, Stevens approaches his
goal of "linking" his history "to intellectual, political, and social
trends" (p. xiv). But even when Stevens' topical discussions are not
so well integrated into the central narrative, they have a certain
toward immigrant groups (pp. 100-01, 126 n.i8, i8o n.3) and, in particular, aiti-Semitism (p.
184 n.41).
26 Stevens describes the mixture of motives in 1929 as "[x]enophobia, economic concerns,
and professional vanity, coupled with a genuine concern for the public interest" (p. 176). His
interpretation of motives during the struggle is more balanced than that of recent commentators
who have sharply criticized the victors. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976); First,
supra note 6.
Stevens repeatedly emphasizes that upgrading and standardization tend to hinder professional
entry by the economically disadvantaged in general (pp. 25-26) and by minorities in particular
(pp. 195-96, 259 n.12i), but he does not attempt to resolve any of the difficult issues. In
Democracy and the Legal Profession, however, he notes that the "ABA deliberately drove out
... the law schools which today would have produced the minority lawyers." Stevens, Democ-
racy, supra note 7, at 68.
27 A few states, notably California, continue to permit graduates of unaccredited law schools
to take the bar examination (pp. 208-09).
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encyclopedic value, and several of them, particularly the examination
of latter-day developments in legal scholarship, 28 are quite effective.
The closing chapters of the book, however, are a disappointment.
In contrast to his account of the rise of the university law schools
between 185o and ig5o, Stevens' narrative of the last thirty years of
legal education lacks a central theme. Instead, Stevens observes that
law school methodology has lately become fragmented (pp. 212, 232),
as the case method of teaching, for example, has yielded partly to
clinical education, legal skills courses, and tutorials. It remains to be
seen whether Stevens' perception of fragmentation is correct or
whether his failure to provide a unifying theme for the events of
recent decades is attributable simply to the increasing difficulty of
organizing and appraising facts as the historian draws nearer to his
own time. 29
To be sure, ending a history such as Stevens' is no easy matter.
The author's solution is to reiterate the conclusions of an article he
published in 1970.30 He suggests that students will continue to be
interested in little but getting into practice as soon as possible, that
law professors will continue selfishly to value above all their indepen-
dence from the nonacademic world, that legal scholarship will con-
tinue to be of more interest to academics than to practicing attorneys,
that legal education will remain seriously underfunded, and that
"new" approaches to legal thinking and "fresh" criticisms of legal
education will in fact repeat the tired old theories of earlier attempts
at reform (pp. 278-79).
The first problem with these conclusions is that their pessimism is
dated. Any appraisal of legal education's role and future made in
1970 is likely to be jaundiced by the despair that then pervaded law
schools and the country as a whole. 3 1 Although observers have not
favorably regarded all developments in legal education since I970, the
rise of "critical legal studies" (p. 275), the attempted integration of
law and economics (p. 272), and the "search for a new form of
[unifying] faith" (p. 274) - each of which Stevens himself describes
- suggest that reforms in legal education are not inevitably "cyclical"
28 Stevens surveys the nature and influence of the work of such postwar academic figures
as Lasswell and McDougal, Hart and Sacks, Calabresi, H.L.A. Hart, and the leaders of the
critical legal studies movement (pp. 264-76). This material is insufficiently tied to the rest of
the book, but the discussion has an elegance of its own, reminiscent of Grant Gilmore's history
of legal thought, G. GILMORE, supra note 14.
29 One hopes that in his next work Stevens will grapple with the issue of democracy versus
elitism in modern-day legal education. In particular, what are the consequences of elitism in
legal education? Does elitism enhance or diminish the contribution of legal education to society?
30 See Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 7, at 546-48.
31 On the effect of the war in Southeast Asia on legal education, see F. ALLEN, LAW,
INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 72 (1979).
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(p. 279).32 The second problem with the book's closing assertions is
that they imply that Stevens has treated the subject of American legal
education more comprehensively than he actually has. For example,
the book's failure to examine in detail the teaching of law33 is not in
itself a great fault. But it is premature to make categorical judgments
about legal education - especially judgments as negative as those
advanced in the book's conclusion - without first considering either
the satisfactions offered by law teaching as an intellectual and humane
endeavor 34 or recent developments likely to increase the value of law
teaching. 35
Notwithstanding these flaws, Law School is an exceedingly useful
work. Although Stevens suggests that his book is no more than "a
tentative step" in the development of "[a] history of legal education
as a whole" (p. xiv), the book is, as such a step, more than successful.
Law School is rich in material that will help us see modern issues
from a more philosophical and historical perspective. Stevens dem-
onstrates that current criticisms of legal education usually have ante-
cedents in (losing) arguments advanced when crucial decisions were
being made in the past. He also demonstrates that earlier advocates
32 Efforts to improve law teaching and to understand it more fully provide additional
examples of the possibility of continued change. The most significant developments have been
an attempt to use legal education to pose lifelong issues of lawyer identity and growth, and an
investigation of the dynamics of teaching and learning theory.
The former is best represented in REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979) (the Cramton Report), and A.
AMSTERDAM, REPORT TO THE LAW SCHOOL DEANS' WORKSHOP ON PROFESSIONAL SKILLS
INSTRUCTION (1982). Stevens notes the Cramton Report (pp. 240, 256-57 nn.86-88) but mis-
leadingly describes it as an attempt to offer the "panacea"' of "clinical legal education" (p. 240).
The great value of both the Cramton and Amsterdam reports is that they advocate a search for
opportunities to probe intellectual, ethical, and interpersonal aspects of professional growth in
all law school courses. See Shreve, Bringing the Educational Reforms of the Cramton Report
Into the Case Method Classroom - Two Models, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 793 (x98I).
Law teachers' interest in theory and behavioral phenomena associated with teaching and
learning has been slow to develop, but it received a stimulus from the AALS through national
teaching clinics sponsored in 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1977. See T. SHAFFER, R. HUBER & F.
STRONG, A CONDENSED HISTORY OF THE AALS LAW TEACHING CLINIC (I977).
33 For example, although the author makes extensive references to the case method and
predicts that it "will continue to dominate legal education" (p. 278), he never satisfactorily
explains what case method teaching is. He makes no more than a cursory attempt to tie the
so-called "Socratic method" to case method teaching (p. 53), and he overstates the present
influence of the case method by observing - inaccurately, I believe - that "[l]ectures have not
returned" to the law school classroom (p. xiv). Recent reports indicate that much if not most
legal teaching is based not on the probing Socratic method associated with the paradigm of the
case method, but on thinly disguised lecture - "the avuncular Socratic method." See Cramton,
The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 322, 328 (2982); see also T.
SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAw STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 262-67 (1977) (noting that
modern legal education has returned to text and lecture).
34 On the intellectual and spiritual pleasures of teaching, see G. HIGHET, THE ART OF
TEACHING (1950).
35 See supra note 32.
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of change had mixed motives and that their goals were often realized
only through the fortuitous influence of outside events. If we already
suspected that American legal education was not the best of all pos-
sible worlds, Law School helps us to understand why: it allows us to
see the current system not as the product of a century's accumulation
of the fairest and most enlightened ideals, but as the result of an
almost accidental displacement of one approach to legal education by
another. The book reminds us that in legal education, as elsewhere,
we must be careful not to mistake power for wisdom.
